Abstract. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) provide sensing and monitoring services by means of many tiny autonomous devices equipped with wireless radio transceivers. As WSNs are deployed on a large-scale and/or on long-term basis, not only traditional security but also privacy issues must be taken into account. Furthermore, when network operators offer on-demand access to sensor measurements to their clients, query mechanisms should ideally leak neither client interests nor query patterns. In this paper, we present a privacy-preserving WSN query mechanism that uses standard cryptographic techniques. Besides preventing unauthorized entities from accessing sensor readings, it minimizes leakage of (potentially sensitive) information about users' query targets and patterns.
Related Work
Techniques for anonymous communication across untrusted networks date back to Chaum's pioneering work on MixNets [10] . Today's state-of-the-art is exemplified by TOR [14] . TOR is geared for low-latency synchronous communication over the Internet and is based on the so-called Onion Routing principle [33] . In this scheme, each router can only identify the previous and the next hop along a route. However, the sequence of routers must be selected and fixed at connection setup. This task is performed by a special entity (TOR proxy).
Other notable prior work focused specifically on MANETs or WSNs. Secure Dynamic Distributed Routing (SDDR) protocol [15] uses Onion Routing to achieve route anonymity, but does not protect anonymity of source and destination. Anonymous On-Demand Routing (ANODR) is geared for ad hoc networks [22] ; it supports untraceable routes or packet flows, with a route pseudonymity approach which decouples a node's location from its identity. ANODR is based on "broadcast with trapdoor information": by embedding certain trapdoor information (known only to the receiver), data is delivered to the receiver but not to other members in the group. However, the identity of the destination is disclosed to nodes along the route and these nodes also gain knowledge of the number of hops from the source. Other interesting results include: SDAR [6] and MASK [39] . However, as pointed out in [35] , all these schemes -including ANODR and SDDR -have a common drawback: a passive adversary monitoring all network traffic (without knowledge of any keys) can trace the route reply (RREP) message from destination back to the source.
There are also some prior results in the area of privacy-awareness in location-based services, ubiquitous environments and wireless sensor networks, such as [18, 29] , where attempts are made to avoid disclosure of the node's location.
Other related work aims to achieve anonymity in WSNs by obfuscating nodes' identifiers. The work in [37] is the first attempt in this direction, with the assumption that sensors are anonymous, i.e., a sensor has no initial unique identifier. Nodes are organized in clusters and are aware of their own location. The attacker wants to identify and eliminate the minimum number of nodes to inflict maximum loss of data. Two anonymous schemes for clustered WSNs are proposed in [27] to provide anonymity, assuming secret keys shared between sensors and the base station are not compromised. Moreover, nodes in a cluster are considered indistinguishable. Anonymous routing is performed by using pseudonyms to keep node identity private in route requests and replies. In [28] , two anonymity techniques are proposed, both based on one-way keyed hash chains. It is assumed that every sensor is aware of its own location and communicates it to the base station. An adversary may eavesdrop on communication and may compromise sensors (to obtain data and individual as well as pairwise encryption keys). The first scheme uses a one-way keyed hash chain to generate a sequence of hash values, each serving as a one-time ID; the second scheme proposes a reverse hashing method.
More recently, [7] presented a scheme that attempts providing query privacy in WSNs. The scheme uses two servers. If these two servers collude, privacy is completely compromised. Furthermore, each sensor needs to store a key for each client, thus resulting in a linear increase in storage overhead. Finally, a scheme for anonymous data collection in WSNs was presented in [20] . The security of this scheme is based on data perturbation 1 , rather than on provably secure cryptographic techniques. In addition, related research was performed in mid-90s to secure itinerant mobile agents computation. A mobile agent can be viewed as a process moving from one site to another, preserving its state and data. A mobile agent can autonomously decide when and where to move. Mobile agents can be used to complete a set of user tasks in an asynchronous, dynamic and heterogeneous environments. For instance, a mobile agent can be used to perform an online ticket reservation. The user launches the agent which migrates from site to site in order to find the best price. An overview of this paradigm -along with associated security issues -is given in [11] . However, no practical solutions were proposed.
Another related work in [24] aims to provide both anonymity (of both sender and receiver) and unlinkability. Since mobile agents can self-navigate through the network, the standard onion routing techniques do not apply, since a route is not known at the source. However, in our scenario, the route is chosen at the start by the client who knows the topology of the WSN. Moreover, [24] provides no details about key management.
Finally, directed diffusion [21] has been employed in WSN to globally address a query to all sensors. However, in our setting such solutions would leak information to malicious nodes near the gateway.
The Setting
We consider a WSN consisting of n nodes that we denote by: {S 1 , · · · , S n }. The owner of the WSN is referred to as OWN and the operator as OPR. As mentioned earlier, these are two distinct entities. Once a sensor obtains environment measurements, it can store the results locally (at least for a short while).
Before deploying the WSN, OWN chooses a symmetric key encryption scheme E(·), e.g., Rijndael [13] . It also initializes a set of parameters for a light-weight and bandwidth-efficient public key scheme [4] denoted by EP(·). One very appropriate choice of EP(·) is the 160-bit Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) [4] , which we present in Appendix.
Next, OWN assigns to each S i a public key y i and a private key x i for EP(·). Then, acting as a Certification Authority (CA), OWN issues to each S i a certificate binding S i to y i .
2 All other tasks are delegated to OPR. At setup time, OPR publishes the network topology, and node identities: {S 1 , · · · , S n } along with their respective locations and certified public keys. In addition, we assume that each S i shares a unique symmetric key with its adjacent neighbors.
The network operates in a read-on-demand model, i.e., it responds to external clients' queries. Clients reach the WSN through a gateway, denoted by GW, which belongs to OPR.
To obtain data from a certain sensor, a user (Alice) forms a query and sends it to GW, which, in turn, communicates with the relevant sensor(s). The queried sensor performs requested measurements and returns the results to Alice, again, via GW.
The Privacy Problem
We decouple security and privacy issues. In our context, the former includes data secrecy, data integrity and authentication. They apply to data provided by the queried sensor: data must be read only by the requesting client; it cannot be replayed, modified or manufactured by the adversary, denoted by ADV. Techniques to provide these security services are standard and do not present a challenge.
The privacy problem is more difficult. We need to ensure that the identity of the queried sensor remains secret to ADV. Recall that, in our case, OPR owns GW and is thus a potential adversary. As a consequence, we also need to keep the content of the reply secret, but for reasons different than simply thwarting unauthorized eavesdroppers. In practice, data collected by sensors is not random; it might depend on the sensor's location. Therefore, if ADV is allowed to see the reply data, it could determine the location of that data's origin and, hence, the target sensor.
We do not consider privacy of the external client, i.e., we assume that Alice is unconcerned about ADV knowing that she is querying the WSN. (If this is not the case, techniques like TOR [14] can readily handle building an anonymous channel between Alice and GW.) Finally, we note that denial of service (DoS) attacks are out of scope of this paper.
Portrait of the Adversary
We consider an adversary ADV who, as mentioned above, controls OPR and GW. In addition, we allow ADV to compromise up to z sensors where, 0 ≤ z ≤ n. We call these z sensors infected. Once a sensor is infected, ADV learns all of its secret keys, and can thus obtain the plaintext of all incoming and outgoing messages.
Although it controls both GW and z sensors, we only consider an honest-but-curious ADV [17] . We assume that each infected sensor can only eavesdrop on packets in its physical proximity. In other words, ADV behaves as a normal sensor during protocol execution (though, it may misuse acquired information). Of course, this generally passive stance does not prevent ADV from playing the role of some legitimate external user and issuing its own queries.
Our Goal
The goal of our work is to keep the identity of the queried sensor secret. By monitoring many of Alice's queries, ADV should only gain a negligible advantage in determining the target sensor. Obviously, if ADV makes a random guess, its success probability should be is 1/n, assuming that query targets are uniformly distributed across the whole WSN. Note that the number of infected nodes has a significant implication on the security notion and on choosing the appropriate approaches. Two extreme scenarios are as follows:
-[z = 0] -ADV controls nothing other than GW. In such scenario, ADV can not eavesdrop on any intersensor communication. Since ADV is at its weakest, solutions can be quite efficient. For instance, one simple approach is to link-encrypt all traffic between GW and all other sensors on the path. We note that this is exactly the level of privacy offered by [7] . -[z = n] -ADV controls all sensors as well as GW. Namely, ADV monitors all traffic in the WSN. This requires the strongest privacy protection. The situation bears a lot of resemblance to PIR [12] . It is thus expected (and likely unavoidable) that schemes offering this level of privacy are impractical, because the computation complexity of any solution is at least linear in terms of WSN size. However, in this worst case, k-anonymity can be achieved.
Challenges
Our scheme is built upon the onion routing technique whereby sensors play the role of an onion router. Though this technique has been intensively studied for Internet-based communications, we have to carefully tackle the following issues to fully solve the problem above.
-Data Collection: The reading from a sensor needs to be returned to a client. In the Internet-based onion routing, the receiver can reply to the sender by constructing a new onion with data enclosed. Such a model is not applicable in sensor networks, because it is too expensive for a sensor to construct an onion. Therefore, the queried sensor has to inject the reading and forward it to the client, without compromising the privacy. -Onion Size: In an Internet onion routing scheme, a node can forward the onion to its next hop via a TCP connection, which does not has any restriction on the onion size. In sensor networks, there is no TCP-like reliable transport protocol. It is expensive for a sensor to buffer packets and application data is always encapsulated into a single packet. Therefore, our protocol does not allow an onion larger than the maximum packet size, which is 128 bytes if using the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Such a constraint affects the maximum number of layers an onion can have. -Energy Consumption: As in many other sensor network applications, it is among the top priorities to preserve the sensor's energy. This restricts the sensor's cost for both the computations and the communications, i.e. receiving and transmitting an onion.
5 Basic Construction The basic idea behind our scheme is to provide anonymity using an onion routing-like technique. To obtain better privacy, we require for each node in the onion route to contribute its own reading. In current onion routing solutions (e.g., TOR), the last hop on the onion route is the destination. This information leakage should be avoided in our protocol due to the presence of infected nodes.
We assume that Alice knows the topology of the network. However, we argue that such assumption is realistic in the applications we consider (cf Section 1). In scenarios such as the urban pollution measurement service, the user is fully aware of the nodes in the network although the network itself is operated by an external contractor.
Alice selects a route which includes the target and a set of other randomly chosen sensors. Both the first and the last hop of the route are set to GW. Alice constructs the query by performing a number of encryptions, each analogous to an onion layer. The query is then forwarded to GW. In the end, Alice receives a reply (through GW) which she processes to obtain the desired measurements.
The WSN query mechanism is composed of three algorithms: 1) query generation, 2) data collection, and 3) data recovery. Alice generates a query and sends it to GW, which runs the data collection algorithm and returns the outcome to Alice. Alice then runs the data recovery algorithm to obtain the readings.
In the rest of the paper, we use the notation in the following Table. Symbol 
Query Generation
Suppose that Alice wants to query a sensor S a . The query consists of two parts:
1. Header: an onion-like structure which governs how sensors forward and respond to the query. The header has t + 1 layers, each corresponding to a sensor hop on the route, where t is a fixed public parameter chosen by Alice. (We expect t to be closely related to WSN diameter). The size of the header is also fixed -L c bits -as the maximum WSN packet length. 2. Body: a random-looking binary string that carries the readings back to Alice. It is comprised of t slots, each containing an L r -bit reading. The positions of sensor readings are randomly permuted by Alice.
(As described later, each onion layer tells the corresponding sensor the slot index within the body where to deposit its encrypted reading.) This way, an intermediate node is unaware of its position in the route.
Path Selection. Using the publicly known WSN topology, Alice selects a random path (containing S a ) of length t + 2:
where all pairs S ij , S ij+1 (0 ≤ j ≤ t + 1) are immediate neighbors and, for some v ∈ [1, t], S iv = S a . However, GW and S i0 (as well as S it+1 and GW) are not required to be adjacent 4 . In other words, Alice constructs a (t + 3)-hop circuit which starts with GW, runs through (t + 2) sensors (among which is S a ) and ends back at GW. See Figure 1 for an example. The path selection process is shown in more detail in Algorithm 1.
Header Construction. First, Alice creates a random permutation of indices {1, 2, · · · , t} which we denote as: π = {p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p t }. Each p j is used to inform S ij (j-th node in the path) where to insert its reading within the body. Furthermore, we define p 0 = 0 and p t+1 = 0. This is to instruct the end-points of the path (S i0 and S it+1 ) that their readings are not needed, since they are both visible to GW. Next, Alice generates a set of t random symmetric (e.g., Rijndael) keys: k 1 , ..., k t and sets k 0 = k t+1 = 0.
She then constructs the header by setting OR t+2 = ∅ and encrypting < k t+1 , GW, p t+1 , OR t+2 > with y it+1 , i.e. S it+1 's public key. Let:
denote the resulting ciphertext. Then, she encrypts < k t , S it+1 , p t , OR t+1 > with y it , which results in:
Alice repeats this process, until computing OR 0 -encryption of < k 0 , S i1 , p 0 , OR 1 > under y i0 . The resulting final onion is showed in Figure 2 . Since the size of the header grows after each encryption, we apply the technique in [19] to keep ciphertext size constant. This approach will prevent any sensor on the onion route from determining its position within the route. The resulting header is an L c -bit string.
Body Construction. The initial body M 0 is just a random binary string of size L r * t. During the data collection phase, random bits are gradually replaced with encrypted readings.
The query construction algorithm outputs the initial query OR 0 , M 0 . Alice then sends it to GW which, forwards it intact to S i0 . Upon receiving the query, each sensor runs Algorithm 2 and forwards the query to the next hop.
Data Collection
When S ij receives OR j , M j , it decrypts OR j and obtains: permuted position p j (in the body) for depositing its reading, next hop S ij+1 , one-time secret key k j and inner onion OR j+1 destined for S ij+1 . (Recall that, if p j = 0, no data is solicited.) Details are shown in Algorithm 2. Each sensor in the route performs the same sequence of steps. It is easy to see that the client's actual target sensor S a can not determine its "special" role.
With every collection step (hop), a layer of the onion is consumed and the size of the header decreases after each decryption. The difference in size can be exploited by ADV(or the current-hop sensor), to determine the position of the current hop in the route. To overcome the problem, we use the approach introduced in [19] . Alice introduces a random δ-bit string as padding in the innermost onion and then trims it after every encryption such that the final onion size is always L c -bits. S ij consumes one layer of the onion and restores its size by appending random bits. This way, neither an eavesdropper nor a sensor in path can derive the Input: (Sa, t, {S1, · · · , Sn}, G) 1 Generate random w ∈r {1, ..., t} 2 Let iw = a /* Sa sits randomly in the path */ 3 for (j ← w − 1 to 0) do Select Si j as a random neighbor of Si j+1
4 Let P = {Si 0 , Si 1 , ..., Si w } where Si w = Sa 5 If (P contains a loop) go to 1 6 for (j ← w + 1 to t) do Select Si j as a random neighbor of Si j−1
7 Let P = {Si w+1 , Si w+2 , ..., Si t } 8 If (P contains a loop) OR (P ∩ P = ∅) go to 7 9 Return Path =< GW, P, P , GW > Algorithm 2: Data Collection: executed by S ij , 0 ≤ j ≤ t + 1
Input: (ORj, Mj) 1 Decrypt ORj using xi j . Abort of failure. 2 Parse decrypted string as: < kj, Si j+1 , pj, ORj+1 >. current (relative) position in the route from the current header size. (However, the last hop is aware of its position in the route since the next hop is GW.) Finally, upon receipt of OR t+2 , M t+2 , GW forwards it intact to Alice. We refer to [19] for the discussion on trimming and padding that keep the onion size constant.
Data Recovery
Alice recovers the reading by unraveling layer-by-layer M t+2 received from GW. Recall that M t+2 is a concatenation of concentrically-encrypted t + 2 blocks of ciphertext. Among them, Alice is only interested in one block at position p v -the one containing the reading from the target sensor S a = S iv . According to the data collection algorithm, this block is encrypted by S iv and super-encrypted by all subsequent hops in the route. There are thus (t + 2 − v) layers of encryption (with keys {k v , ..., k t+1 }, respectively) which must be stripped off one-by-one in order for Alice to obtain α v . The recovery phase is shown in Algorithm 3.
Analysis

Security Analysis
We note that observing the onion does not reveal any information apart from the next hop of the route. After decrypting an incoming onion, a sensor obtains an inner onion. Every onion is in fact the ciphertext of a public key envelope encryption. Therefore, given a semantically secure public key encryption scheme, the onion reveals no information except its length, provided that the sensor does not possess the corresponding To show the effectiveness and the scalability of our privacy solution, we plot the above probability with different adversarial and network settings. Figure 3 shows that for different network sizes, namely n = 100, 1000, and 10000, using a constant size onion route of t = 20 hops, the probability of ADV breaking the privacy scales according to the ratio of infected nodes. The worst case, i.e. t-anonimity is reached for 100% of infected nodes. Finally, we stress that, since the worst case for our scheme is t-anonymity, we can let the client select the same route for the same queried node. Thus, ADV can not intersect its views of query executions.
Performance Analysis
Both query generation and data recovery algorithms are executed by a client (external to the WSN) which has sufficient computing resources to handle standard cryptographic operations. Therefore, our performance analysis only focuses on sensor energy consumption due the execution of the data collection algorithm and in forwarding an onion.
Using experiment results from the relevant literature, we estimate the computation energy cost of the sensors on the onion route. Note that sensors not on the route do not perform any computation and the expensive onion generation is done by the client instead of a sensor. A sensor on the route performs only one ECC decryption and one Rijndael encryption. We refer to a configurable ECC engine -TinyECC [25] . [2] shows that an Imote2 (13MHz) consumes 13.73 mJ in performing a 160-ECC decryption. An earlier result in [23] measured the cost of symmetric key encryption in sensors. According to it, speed-optimized Rijndael in CBC mode requires around 350 CPU cycles to encrypt a 90-byte message. Based on the Imote2 data-sheet [2], the CPU of Imote2 operates at low voltage (0.85v) and low frequency (13MHz). Thus, we estimate that one Rijndael-CBC decryption of an onion costs roughly 1 mJ (CPU only), which is negligible as compared with the cost of public key (e.g., ECIEC) operations.
Another factor in energy consumption is due to onion forwarding. The maximum size of a TinyOS packet is 128 bytes [1] , including 11-byte header and 2-byte CRC. According to the CC2420 data-sheet, for the radio transceiver of Imote2, it costs about 123mK and 114mJ to receive and transmit a 128-byte packet, respectively. Therefore, the total estimated energy cost for a sensor on the route is roughly 250mJ.
The proposed scheme significantly saves energy compared to reading all the sensors. Indeed, energy consumption of sensor nodes is affected mainly by communication rather than computation, and reading all sensors entails significant communication overhead. Compared to the PIR approach mentioned in Section 1, our scheme is also more cost-effective. In our solution, sensors are awakened only when reached by a query. In contrast, the PIR approach awakens all sensors periodically, even if some readings are not requested.
Onion route length. The size of the packet limits the query header size, and consequently the onion route length. We use two optimization tricks to minimize the size increase of the query header. The ECIES ciphertext consists of the output from a symmetric key encryption and a 160-bit random number R. One optimization is that R can be reused for every ECIES encryption in the query 5 , which is provably secure as shown in [5] . The other optimization is that k t in Equation 1 can be the same symmetric key used in the ECIES encryption for OR t . S it can derive it when it deciphers the onion. Note that the ciphertext of a symmetric key encryption has almost the same length as its plaintext. Thus, OR j is only slightly longer than OR j+1 due to the insertion of S ij+1 and p j .
The query generation algorithm outputs (t · L r + L c )-bit onions. Let the sensor identities be b bits long. Therefore, L c = 160 + (b + log t)t. The total onion route size is thus 160 + (L r + b)t + t log t. Since the payload of a packet is 115 bytes, we have t = 22 in a conservative estimation, when L r = b = 16. An Imote2 sensor's antenna covers about 30 meters. For larger onion length, we propose two extended constructions in the next section.
Extensions
The scheme presented in Section 5 illustrates the basic idea of using onion routing in a sensor network. However, this approach is not always fully scalable to large WSNs since we anticipate the onion route length to be close to the network diameter. Moreover, as the WSN gets larger, the maximum packet size typically remains the same. This limits the number of hops in the onion route. For this reason, we propose two extensions: overlay onion routing and hybrid onion routing.
Overlay Onion Routing
In this approach, Alice randomly picks a set of t + 1 sensors. However, unlike before, these sensors (S ij and S ij+1 ) are not required to be adjacent. This set of sensors, together with Alice's target sensor S a (placed at a random position between 1 and t) form a t + 3-hop overlay onion route starting and ending in GW. The data collection algorithm and the data recovery algorithm remain unchanged. Transmission between two elements of the onion route is obtained via WSN's own routing mechanism. With this approach, the choice of t is independent of the size of WSN.
Nonetheless, as a result, we trade some privacy for efficiency and scalability. In fact, a compromised node residing on the route segment between S ij and S ij+1 can learn S ij+1 by simple eavesdropping. Thus, ADV has a higher probability in learning a hop in an onion route than in the basic scheme. The exact probability advantage depends on the underlying WSN routing protocol. Since messages in a typical WSN are transmitted in a broadcast fashion, this probability is non-negligible. (However, simple link encryption can be used to reduce -but not prevent -such attacks.)
Hybrid Onion Routing
Both the basic scheme and the overlay extension are geared for WSNs composed of homogeneous sensor nodes. The concept of heterogeneous sensor networks [38, ?] has been explored recently in order to improve reliability of data transmissions. This hybrid type of WSN involves a set of powerful backhaul nodes which form an overlay network, thus allowing high-bandwidth and highly-reliable communications. We can extend our basic scheme by exploiting the features of hybrid WSNs. The main idea is to use overlay onion routing to forward along a route of randomly chosen backhaul nodes, while these backhaul nodes use our basic scheme to collect data from regular sensors. We omit any further description of this extension since it is rather intuitive.
Query Pattern Privacy
The basic scheme entails Alice using the same route for repeated queries of a given target sensor. Although this prevents ADV from learning the location of Alice's target, it exposes Alice's query patterns. In other words, given m queries executed by Alice, ADV can derive the frequency distribution of Alice's targets, even though their identities are unknown.
One remedy is for Alice to construct a small pool of randomly selected sensors, denoted by Γ . The set size depends on the size of her target set. When constructing an onion route, Alice selects a fixed number of onion sensors (say, c) from Γ and t − c − 1 sensors from the entire population of sensors. This way, ADV can not determine whether a duplicate occurrence of a sensor is due to the retrieval from Γ or Alice's query pattern.
